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Bowers v. Hardwick: An Incomplete Constitutional Analysis
Homosexuals and incidents of homosexual sodomy have existed throughout
history.' Plato, 2 Julius Caesar,3 Kings Edward II and Henry III,4 and Leo-
nardo da Vinci5 were all homosexuals. More recent examples include Gertrude
Stein, 6 J. Edgar Hoover,7 and John Maynard Keynes.8 Homosexuality has been
called an abominable sin not fit to be named among Christians, a way of life, an
illness, and a crime against nature.9 For nearly as long as there have been
homosexuals, sodomy has been a crime. 10 Under the Code of Justinian t and
the laws of the thirteen colonies12 it was a capital offense. Today sodomy is a
crime punishable by fine and imprisonment in nearly half the states.
13
One homosexual, Michael Hardwick, was arrested and charged under
Georgia's sodomy statute.14 In Bowers v. Hardwick' 5 he brought an action
seeking a declaratory judgment that the Georgia statute violated his constitu-
tional rights under the first, fourth, fifth, eighth, ninth, and fourteenth amend-
ments. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court dismissed Hardwick's suit
for failing to state a claim on which relief could be granted. 16 In doing so, the
1. V. BULLOUGH, HOMOSEXUALITY: A HISTORY 2 (1979).
2. M. GREIF, THE GAY BOOK oF DAYS 104 (1982).
3. Id. at 123. But see V. BULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 139 (questioning evidence surrounding
Julius Caesar's homosexuality).
4. V. BULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 141-43.
5. V. BULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 145.
6. V. BULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 148.
7. M. GREIF, supra note 2, at 16. But see V. BULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 139 (questioning
evidence surrounding J. Edgar Hoover's homosexuality).
8. V. BULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 148.
9. V. BULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 1, 19, 35-36.
10. V. BULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 31.
11. The Justinian Code is more formally known as the Corpusjuris civilis, "the sixth-century
encyclopedic collection of Roman laws made under the sponsorship of the Emperor Justinian. It is
Justinian's collection which served as the basis of canon law (the law of the Christian Church) and
civil law (both European and English)." V. BULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 32. The Justinian Code
incorporated an even earlier law promulgated in 390 A.D.:
All persons who have the shameful custom of condemning a man's body, acting the part of
a woman's, to the sufferance of an alien sex (for they appear not to be different from wo-
men), shall expiate a crime of this kind by avenging flames in the sight of the people.
Id. at 31.
12. V. BULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 43-44.
13. Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 521, 524 n.9 (1986) [hereinafter Survey].
14. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2842 (1986). Section 16-6-2 of the Georgia Code
provides, in part:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual
act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.... (b) A
person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less
than one nor more than 20 years.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
15. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (5-4 decision).
16. Id. at 2843, 2847. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, thus agreeing with the
district court's dismissal of Hardwick's claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
See id. at 2843. Rule 12(b) allows defensive pleaders the option of raising seven enumerated defenses
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Supreme Court failed to consider many of the issues Hardwick raised, such as
privacy and due process, and others that, although Hardwick did not raise them,
the Court should nevertheless have considered, such as establishment and equal
protection. Because the Supreme Court did not expressly examine these consti-
tutional claims, its opinion leaves doubt whether dismissal was appropriate.
This Note reexamines those issues that the Court considered and also analyzes
those the Court ignored. The Note concludes that Bowers raised issues inappro-
priate for pretrial dismissal that should have been considered at trial.
In August 1982 Atlanta police arrested Michael Hardwick in his home and
charged him with committing the crime of sodomy.1 7 After a preliminary hear-
ing, however, the district attorney decided not to present the case to a grand jury
unless further evidence developed.1 8 Hardwick then brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, challenging the con-
stitutionality of the Georgia sodomy statute.19 An admitted homosexual, Hard-
wick claimed that the statute placed him in imminent danger of arrest for the
acts of sodomy he had committed.20 The complaint named Michael Bowers,
Attorney General of Georgia, and other state officials as defendants. 2 1
Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief
could be granted.22 Such a dismissal is proper only if there are no possible
grounds that would support the claim. 23 The district court, relying on Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney,24 granted defendant's motion.25 In Doe plaintiff
homosexuals challenged the constitutionality of Virginia's sodomy laws.2 6 The
district court in Doe upheld the Virginia statute,27 reasoning that the right of
privacy did not extend to homosexual sodomy,28 and the United States Supreme
Court summarily affirmed the lower court's ruling.29 The Hardwick district
court found Doe to be on point and the Supreme Court's summary affirmance to
and objections by motion prior to their responsive pleading. Courts may consider such motions
before trial. Rule 12(b)(6) is the specific defense of "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
17. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986);
see GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
18. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1204. In addition to Attorney General Bowers, Hardwick named as
defendants Lewis Slaton, District Attorney for Fulton County, and George Napper, Public Safety
Commissioner of Atlanta. Id. Joining Hardwick in his complaint were John and Mary Doe, a
married heterosexual couple who claimed to have been "chilled and deterred" from engaging in
activities proscribed by the Georgia statute. Id. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the
Does' claim, however, for a lack of standing. Id. at 1207.
22. Id. at 1204.
23. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714,
716 (8th Cir. 1974); Parr v. Great Lakes Express Co., 484 F.2d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 1973); 5 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357, at 601-02 (1969).
24. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), afl'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
25. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842.
26. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1200, 1202. For further discussion of Doe, see infra text accompanying notes 97-103.
29. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901, 901 (1976).
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be binding.30
Hardwick appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit. The court of appeals distinguished Doe, citing later
Supreme Court cases indicating a willingness to reconsider the right of privacy
issue.3 1 Relying on Griswold v. Connecticut,3 2 the appellate court went on to
hold that the Georgia statute violated Hardwick's constitutional right of pri-
vacy.3 3 In Griswold a married couple challenged Connecticut's right to prohibit
the sale of contraceptives. The Supreme Court struck down the law, holding
that it violated the couple's right of privacy.3 4 The court of appeals in Hardwick
cited later Supreme Court cases that extended the privacy doctrine to unmarried
couples' right to contraceptives, 35 women's right to abortions, 3 6 and individuals'
privacy interest in their homes. 37 It was a small step for the Hardwick court of
appeals to hold that the right of privacy protected individuals' sexual conduct in
their homes.3 8 The appellate court ruled that for the statute to be upheld, the
state would have to prove that the statute supported a compelling interest.3 9
Defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. 4° The
Court took the case, determined the court of appeals had erred, and reversed its
judgment. 4 1 After defining the issue as whether homosexuals have a constitu-
tional right to engage in sodomy, the Supreme Court refused to extend the right
of privacy to homosexual behavior.4 2 It reasoned that the Griswold line of cases
established a right of privacy only in matters of family, marriage, and procrea-
tion.43 The Court stated, "[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procre-
ation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated .... ")44
In addition, the Court reaffirmed the standard by which a claimed right
qualifies for constitutional protection. 45 The right must be" 'implicit in the con-
30. Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1204.
31. Id. at 1208-09. The court of appeals reasoned that the Supreme Court's affirmance could
have been based on the fact the Doe plaintiffs lacked standing, rather than on the constitutional
claims. Id. at 1207-08. The appellate court concluded that it should be bound only by "the most
narrow plausible rationale for the summary decision [standing]." Id. at 1208.
32. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
33. Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1212.
34. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86. The right of privacy, however, is not expressly mentioned in
the Constitution. "The constitutional origins of this right were hotly disputed; no more than three
Justices could agree on any one theory about its parentage. Nonetheless, seven Justices did agree
that a protectable intention had been asserted." Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection For
Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 670, 671 (1973).
35. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
37. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
38. See Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1212.
39. Id. at 1213. The state would have to prove also that the statute was the most narrowly
drawn means of supporting the state interest. Id.
40. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2843-44.
44. Id. at 2844.
45. Id.
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cept of ordered liberty' ",46 or" 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion.' 47 Given that laws have proscribed sodomy for centuries,4 8 the Court
found it obvious that neither standard would allow the extension of a fundamen-
tal right to the right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy.49
Finally, the Court held that homosexual conduct is not protected even
when it occurs in the home. It distinguished Stanley v. Georgia,50 a case involv-
ing the private possession of obscene material,51 on the ground that Stanley re-
lied entirely on the first amendment freedoms of speech and press, not the fourth
amendment sanctity of the home.52
Justice Powell provided the critical swing vote in this five to four decision.5 3
Like the majority, he found no constitutional right to engage in homosexual
sodomy.54 In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Powell stated that had
Hardwick been imprisoned for any substantial length of time, an eighth amend-
ment issue of cruel and unusual punishment would have been raised.5 5 Justice
Powell reasoned that because Hardwick had not yet been tried, the issue was not
properly before the Court.5 6
In a dissenting opinion Justice Blackmun criticized the majority opinion on
several grounds. First, Justice Blackmun argued that the Court focused too nar-
rowly on homosexual sodomy when it should have considered the broader right
of individuals to control the nature of their intimate relationships.5 7 Second, he
stated that even if the right of privacy under the due process clause did not
protect Hardwick, the fourth amendment encompassed Hardwicek's intimate
conduct because it occurred in his home.5 8 Last, Justice Blackmun asserted that
the majority based its holding on the historical prohibition of sodomy and such
reliance was improper.5 9
In past cases homosexuals have sought protection under almost every con-
stitutional rubric in the Bill of Rights. Most actions have relied primarily on the
right of privacy 60 and the first amendment rights of free speech and expres-
sion. 6 1 Other suits have been based on the equal protection clauses of state con-
46. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
47. Id. (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
48. Id. at 2845-46 (citing Survey, supra note 13, at 524 n.9).
49. Id. at 2846.
50. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
51. Id. at 558-59.
52. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
53. See id. at 2847-48 (Powell, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 2847 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2848 (Powell, J., concurring).
57. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 2850-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2854-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. See, e.g., People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 486-89, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940-41, 434 N.Y.S.2d
947, 950-51 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
61. See, e.g., Aumiller v. University of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1302 (D. Del. 1977).
1987] 1103
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stitutions 62 and the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution.63 Still other actions have relied on the first amendment es-
tablishment clause and on the eighth amendment proscription of cruel and unu-
sual punishment. 64 At least one suit was based on the fourteenth amendment
limitations on police power.65 In most of these cases, parties challenging state
sodomy laws have relied on more than one theory to justify their constitutional
claim.66
The first theory, the right of privacy, stresses the fundamental import of an
individual's sexuality in contrast to the weak interest a state has in regulating
private, consensual sexual behavior. 67 The argument is grounded in the classic
notion that people have a right to make decisions of fundamental importance to
them that are beyond the permissible reach of the state. Note, for example,
Justice Brandeis' famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States,68 in which he
wrote that the Constitution's framers "conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men."'69
Although not explicit in the Constitution, Supreme Court decisions have
established the privacy doctrine as a constitutional right. In Griswold the Court
held that the right to privacy protects the use of contraceptives by married
couples. 70 In Eisenstadt v. Baird71 the Court found that both the equal protec-
tion clause and the right of privacy confer on unmarried couples the right to
obtain contraceptives. 72 Extending the right of privacy beyond the marital rela-
tionship, the Court wrote:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the
marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent en-
tity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individ-
uals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, mar-
ried or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion. 73
Having extended protection to unmarried persons using contraceptives, the
62. See, e.g., Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 467-68, 595
P.2d 592, 597-98, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 19-20 (1979).
63. See, eg., benShalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 976-77 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
64. See Richards, Homosexuality and the Constitutional Right To Privacy, 8 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 311, 311 (1979).
65. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 99, 415 A.2d 47, 51 (1980).
66. See, e.g., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (right to privacy, equal
protection); Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1199 (due process, freedom of expression, right to privacy, cruel
and unusual punishment).
67. Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classifi-
cation, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1285, 1288 (1985).
68. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
69. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 81 (E.
Rapaport ed. 1978) (noting that society should not interfere with "purely personal conduct").
70. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
71. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
72. Id. at 453-54.
73. Id. at 453.
1104 [Vol. 65
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Court in Roe v. Wade74 took only a small step in holding that the right of pri-
vacy covered a woman's right to an abortion. 75 Three years later, in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth,76 the Supreme Court again extended the right of pri-
vacy to individuals when it held that neither the consent of parents of a female
minor 77 nor the consent of the husband 78 may be required for a woman to have
an abortion. More recently, in Carey v. Population Services International,79 the
Supreme Court ruled that a New York law which criminalized the unauthorized
sale or distribution of contraceptives violated the right of privacy.8 0 The Court
reiterated its earlier statements that the right of personal privacy includes an
interest in independently making certain important decisions. 8 1
Several commentators interpreted the Griswold line of cases to mean that
the privacy doctrine encompasses a broad right to sexual self-determination that
includes the right to engage in homosexual behavior.8 2 The Court, however,
had not yet settled on a standard or formula by which to apply the privacy
doctrine.83 Instead, the Court used indefinite terms like rights" 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' "84 or rights "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition."'8 5
Regardless, several courts have used the right of privacy to attack the con-
stitutionality of state sodomy laws.8 6 Often courts suggest that sodomy statutes
as applied to married couples might be unconstitutional. 87 Some courts have
held that a state cannot regulate private consensual heterosexual activities, re-
74. 410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
75. Id. at 153. Justice Blackmun wrote, "This right of privacy... is broad enough to encom-
pass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id.; see Comment, The Right
of Privacy and Other Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Statutes, 15 U. TOL. L. REv. 811, 823
(1984).
76. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
77. Id. at 72-75.
78. Id. at 67-71.
79. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
80. Id. at 684-91.
81. Id. at 684. The Court wrote, "This right of personal privacy includes 'the interest in inde-
pendence in making certain kinds of important decisions."' Id. (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 599-600 (1977)).
82. See J. BAER, EQUALrrY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 231 (1983) ("The courts have refused,
on nonexistent grounds, to extend this right [of privacy] to homosexuals."); Richards, supra note 64,
at 311 ("There is no principled way to defend the earlier right to privacy cases and not extend the
right to homosexuality.").
83. See Richards, supra note 64, at 311; Comment, supra note 75, at 828.
84. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)); see Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 219, 230
(1965). When deciding whether to extend protection to homosexual sodomy, the Bowers Court in-
voked the "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" standard. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844 (quoting
Palko, 302 U.S. at 325).
85. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977), quoted in Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
86. Comment, supra note 75, at 835.
87. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 n.10 ("Indeed, the Georgia Attorney General concedes that
Georgia's statute would be unconstitutional if applied to a married couple.") (Stevens, J., dissenting).
But see Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.) (en bane) (married couple's conviction for sodomy
upheld because they effectively waived the right of privacy by allowing a third party to participate in
their sexual activities, and by taking photographs of these activities that the couple's children later
found and took to school), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
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gardless of whether the participants are married 88 A few courts have extended
constitutional protection to homosexual sodomy.8 9 In People v. Onofre,90 for
example, the New York Court of Appeals expressly extended constitutional pro-
tection to homosexual conduct.9 1 The court invalidated a New York statute
criminalizing any act of sodomy, reasoning that the privacy doctrine protected
"what at least once was commonly regarded as 'deviant' conduct, so long as the
decisions are voluntarily made by adults in a noncommercial, private setting."'92
The majority of courts, however, have refused to extend the right of privacy to
consensual sexual behavior outside of marriage, much less to homosexual con-
duct.93 In Hughes v. State,94 for example, a case involving a criminal prosecu-
tion for sodomy, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the privacy
doctrine established by Griswold "clearly does not lend itself to either a hetero-
sexual or homosexual relationship between unmarried persons."' 95 The Hughes
court read the Griswold right of privacy as limited to marital intimacy.96
The United States Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of
state sodomy laws in Doe.97 Plaintiff homosexuals brought suit seeking a declar-
atory judgment on the constitutionality of Virginia's sodomy law.98 The Doe
plaintiffs argued that the statute violated their rights to privacy, due process,
freedom of expression, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. 99 The
district court, however, found no violations. 10 Examining Griswold and Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman,10 1 the court found no nexus between homo-
sexual sodomy and marriage, family, and the home on which to extend the pri-
vacy doctrine's protection.10 2 On appeal the Supreme Court summarily affirmed
88. See, e.g., State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976); State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d
348 (Iowa 1976); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d. 47 (1980).
89. See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that state's sodomy
law violated homosexual's rights of privacy and equal protection), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1985); Acanfona v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), affd on other grounds, 491
F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); see Comment, supra note 75, at 836.
90. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981).
91. Id. at 485, 415 N.E.2d at 938-39, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
92. Id. at 488, 415 N.E.2d at 940-41, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
93. Comment, supra note 75, at 837; see, eg., State v. Poe, 40 N.C. App. 385, 252 S.E.2d 843,
disc. review denied, 298 N.C. 303, 259 S.E.2d 304 (1979), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 947 (1980);
State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980). Both Poe and Santos involved criminal convictions forforced sodomy, when there was an issue concerning the victims' consent. The courts held that even
with consent, the activities would not be protected. Poe, 40 N.C. App. at 387-88, 252 S.E.2d at 844-
45; Santos, 413 A.2d at 67-68.
94. 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972).
95. Id. at 505, 289 A.2d at 305.
96. Id.
97. 425 U.S. 901 (1976); see Comment, supra note 75, at 838.
98. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1200. Virginia's sodomy law was codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-
212 (1950) (repealed 1975). Virginia's current statute criminalizes only forcible, not consensual,
sodomy. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.1 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
99. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
100. Id.
101. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
102. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1200-02. The court also reasoned that because states had long
criminalized sodomy, such laws were supported by some rational basis of state interest. Id. at 1202-
03.
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the lower court's judgment.10 3
Doe, however, was not the final word on the constitutionality of sodomy
laws: first, procedural aspects of the Court's summary affirmance put Doe's
precedential weight in question;1°4 and second, later Supreme Court decisions
seem to undermine Doe's authority. 10 5 Based on these questions, the courts in
Onofre and a few other cases have distinguished Doe and extended the right of
privacy to homosexual sodomy.10 6 Most courts, however, have refused to ex-
tend the right of privacy beyond the traditional institutional frameworks of mar-
riage, procreation, and family.10 7
In addition to the right of privacy given to individuals under the fourteenth
amendment, the fourth amendment imbues the home with a separate privacy
interest.108 The fourth amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be
103. Doe, 425 U.S. at 901.
104. The Supreme Court has stated, "When we summarily affirm, without opinion.... we affirm
the judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by which it was reached. An unexplicated summary
affirmance settles the issues for the parties .... ." Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1975)
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added); accord Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977)
(per curiam). In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Court stated that a summary affirm-
ance is "not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of [the Supreme] Court treating
the [same] question on the merits." Id. at 671.
Yet, in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), the Court wrote, " 'Votes to affirm summarily
are votes on the merits of the case ....' Id. at 344 (quoting Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Prince, 360
U.S. 246, 247 (1959)). The Hicks Court went on to state that a Supreme Court summary affirmance
has binding precedential weight. Id.; accord J. MOORE, H. BENDIX & B. RINGLE, MOORE'S FED-
ERAL P.AcrIcE 400.05-1 (2d ed. 1982) ("[S]ummary affirmances of lower federal court judgments
... are decisions on the merits, and are binding upon lower courts ...."). As a result of this
uncertainty, courts have held both ways regarding whether Doe is binding. For decisions relying on
Doe, see Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc); Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d
349 (4th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); Berg v. Clayton, 436 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C.
1977). For decisions distinguishing Doe, see Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982),
rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985); benShalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis.
1980); Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947.
105. Even if Doe's precedential weight was not uncertain because of summary affirmance ques-
tions, later decisions undermined Doe's authority. See Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1209. In Carey, for
example, the Court wrote that it "has not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to
what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior
among adults." Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5, 694 n.17. The Court stated also that although individual
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraceptives, and the family were clearly protected, it
had not yet defined the "outer limits" of the privacy doctrine. Id. at 684-85.
In New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246 (1984), the Court dismissed a writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted in a case involving a statute proscribing loitering in public for the purpose of
soliciting another to engage in deviate sexual behavior. Id. at 247-49; see N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 240.35-3 (McKinney 1980). The Court stated that Uplinger was an inappropriate vehicle for
resolving constitutional issues, including the constitutionality of sodomy laws. See Uplinger, 467
U.S. at 247-49; Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1210.
A lower court is not bound by Supreme Court decisions it believes the Court would overrule
today. Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. American Airlines, Inc., 733 F.2d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1984);
see, e.g., Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 902-04 (7th Cir. 1982); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F.
Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala.), afid, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam). Given that rule, along with
Carey and Uplinger, a few courts have declined to follow Doe. See, e.g., Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1210;
benShalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 476, 415
N.E.2d at 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
106. See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1985); benShalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at
476, 415 N.E.2d at 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
107. See Note, supra note 67, at 1288-89.
108. E.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601
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secure in their ... houses." 10 9 In United States v. Orito1 10 the Supreme Court
stated, "The Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home,
just as it protects other special privacy rights such as those of marriage, procrea-
tion, motherhood, child rearing, and education."1 ' 1 Activities that would other-
wise be illegal are often protected merely because they occur in the home. In
Stanley, for example, a man had the right to possess and watch in his home
obscene films that would not have had constitutional protection if publicly dis-
played.' 1 2 In the context of homosexual sodomy, behavior that would be illegal
if conducted in public, as in a restroom or car, is arguably protected if conducted
in the privacy of the home. In most cases in which the defendant is arrested for
committting sodomy in the home, like in Bowers or in Onofre, a fourth amend-
ment claim for privacy supplements the more general claim of privacy under the
fourteenth amendment.113
A second constitutional claim under which homosexuals have sought pro-
tection is the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 114 The pur-
pose of the clause is to protect people from unequal treatment based on
irrelevant characteristics that do not belie a person's moral or social worth and
that are not legitimate bases of state regulation. 1 5 Statutes that on their face
distinguish between married couples' acts of sodomy and such acts committed
by homosexuals or unmarried heterosexuals raise an issue of equal protection.
In both Onofre and Commonwealth v. Bonadio116 defendants successfully
challenged such a statute. 117 In Bonadio unmarried heterosexuals were arrested
in an adult club for violating the state sodomy statute. Because the sodomy
statute distinguished between sodomy committed by married people and sodomy
committed by unmarried people, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held it vio-
lated the equal protection clause.' 18 Similarly, statutes that do not expressly
discriminate on the basis of marriage, but that are enforced only against unmar-
(1980) (There is an "overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our
traditions since the origins of the Republic."); see Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2850-51 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
109. U.S. CON T. amend. IV.
110. 413 U.S. 139 (1973). The Supreme Court distinguished Stanley, which protected the pri-
vate possession of obscene material in the home, from Orito because Orito involved the interstate
transportation of such material. Id.
111. Id. at 142.
112. The Stanley Court reasoned that the state's interest in proscribing obscenity did not over-
come the first amendment in all instances, particularly because Stanley's possession of the films in his
home added an extra dimension of constitutional protection under the privacy doctrine. Stanley,
394 U.S. at 563-65.
113. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2850-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
114. No state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see, eg., Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d
458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 109, 415 A.2d 47
(1980).
115. See Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1023, 1065 (1979); Note, supra note 67, at 1299.
116. 490 Pa. 109, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
117. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 485, 415 N.E.2d at 937-38, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949; Bonadio, 490 Pa. at
99, 415 A.2d at 51; see Comment, supra note 75, at 845.
118. Bonadio, 490 Pa. at 99, 415 A.2d at 51.
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tied couples or homosexuals raise an equal protection issue. 1 9 Several courts,
however, have held that sodomy laws do not unconstitutionally discriminate
against homosexuals, either as written or as applied.120 In United States v. Co-
zart,12 1 for example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a mere
failure to prosecute heterosexuals for sodomy did not show discriminatory en-
forcement when homosexuals were tried for the same conduct.122
The equal protection clause also provides constitutional protection for cer-
tain suspect classes of individuals who have suffered broad societal discrimina-
tion. 123 In Loving v. Virginia,124 for example, the state charged a racially mixed
married couple with violating Virginia's miscegenation statute. The Supreme
Court invalidated the law because race is a suspect class.1 25 Like the privacy
doctrine, equal protection's "suspectness" is piecemeal in the common law.
Classificiations based on illegitimacy 26 and gender,127 for example, have been
subject to close scrutiny while old age 128 and income level 12 9 classifications at-
tract only minimal examination.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,130 however, the
Supreme Court set out four criteria for determining the existence of a suspect
class. First, the group must be stigmatized from a history of prejudice.13 ' Sec-
ond, the class must suffer from unequal treatment.132 Third, the classification
must be based on some immutable trait that all members share. 133 Last, the
group must be a discrete and insular minority unable to protect its interests
119. Comment, supra note 75, at 846-47.
120. See, eg., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Navy regulation permitting
discharge for homosexual activity does not violate rights to privacy and equal protection); Hatheway
v. Secretary of Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.) (prosecuting only heterosexuals under military regu-
lation that makes it a crime to engage in sodomy with another person of same or opposite sex does
not violate equal protection), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547
P.2d 6 (1976), cerL denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1977). But see State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa
1976).
121. 321 A.2d 342 (D.C. 1974).
122. Id. at 344.
123. See Note, supra note 67, at 1298.
124. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
125. Id.
126. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1979) (classifications based on illegitimacy not subject to strict
scrutiny but must be substantially related to permissable state interests).
127. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (classifications by gender must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of such objectives).
128. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (strict scrutiny is not the
proper standard for testing validity of statute requiring retirement at age 50 for state policemen;
rather the statute must be rationally related to its purpose).
129. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (school financing systems
bore rational relationship to legitimate state purpose).
130. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez plaintiffs brought a suit on behalf of school children in
poor school districts claiming that the allocation of resources according to property taxes violated
the equal protection clause. The Supreme Court held that poor people do not fit the "traditional
indicia of suspectness." Id. at 28; see Comment, supra note 75, at 848; Note, supra note 67, at 1298-
1300.
131. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
132. Id.; see Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1976) (law has long placed the illegiti-
mate child in an inferior position).
133. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28; see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (Brennan,
J., plurality opinion) (sex is an immutable characteristic).
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through ordinary political means.13 4 Groups qualifying for suspect classifica-
tion receive heightened judicial protection, usually in the form of voiding dis-
criminatory laws. 135 Thus far, however, courts have limited protection to
traditional groups and have refused to hold homosexuals to be a suspect class.1 36
Just as homosexuals have used privacy and equal protection, they have also
used the first amendment protection of speech, expression, and association in
their pursuit of homosexual rights.' 37 A number of courts have found extensive
first amendment protection of homosexual activities, including the right to asso-
ciate freely, 138 to advocate homosexual rights, 139 and to engage in symbolic ex-
pression. 14  In Fricke v. Lynch14 1 the United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island held that a male high school student could take a male
date to the high school prom because such an act was symbolic and therefore
protected by the first amendment. A few courts, however, have refused to recog-
nize these first amendment rights.' 42
All courts, regardless of how broadly they interpret the first amendment,
"have drawn a distinction between the words spoken and the reality they repre-
134. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28; see United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938).
135. Traditionally, courts have applied two standards of scrutiny: strict and minimal. Com-
ment, supra note 75, at 847. Strict scrutiny requires that the state show a necessary and compelling
interest in discriminating against the suspect class. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S.
621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Ap-
plication of strict scrutiny is almost always fatal to the statute in question. E.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at
11; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (state must show "pressing public neces-
sity").
Minimal scrutiny, however, requires only some rational relationship between the law and a
permissible state objective. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (economic legisla-
tion will be upheld if it is reasonable and bears a rational relationship to state objective); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday blue laws will not be set aside if any facts can reasonably
justify them). Statutes almost always survive minimal scrutiny. E.g., Boraas, 416 U.S. at 7-8; Mc-
Gowan, 366 U.S. at 426. In McGowan the Court held that the rational relationship test would be
satisfied if "any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify" the law. McGowan, 366 U.S.
at 426.
Because the choice between strict or minimal is so extreme, courts have developed an intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny. Note, supra note 67, at 1298; see Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (standard
for illegitimacy); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (standard for gender). This new level of scrutiny
requires that the law be substantially related to an important state goal. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 199 (1976); Reed, 404 U.S. at 76. Intermediate review is similar to a balancing test or rule
of reason. See Note, supra note 67, at 1298.
136. See Comment, supra note 75, at 848-50; Note, supra note 67, at 1298-99.
137. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), the
Supreme Court split the freedom of association into two parts: intimate and expressive association.
This split effectively subsumed the freedom of association into the rights of privacy and freedom of
expression. Id. at 617-18. As a result, freedom of association is not a separate ground for asserting
homosexual rights. See Note, supra note 67, at 1292-93.
138. See, e.g., Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 857 (8th Cir. 1977) (public univer-
sity's refusal to recognize gay student organization violates first amendment), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1080 (1978).
139. See, e.g., Aumiller v. University of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977) (teacher's first
amendment rights violated when state university refused to renew his contract after his comments
about homosexuality appeared in newspaper).
140. See, e.g., Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980).
141. 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980).
142. See Note, supra note 67, at 1293.
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sent-the expression is protected, the lifestyle is not."'14 3 An ROTC cadet was
discharged under army regulations for saying "I am a lesbian" to a superior
officer. The United States District Court for the District of Maine ordered the
cadet's reenrollment and held that a statement of desire or intent, without les-
bian conduct, was protected speech. 144 Although there are arguments for ex-
tending first amendment protection to homosexual sodomy, 14 5 the speech/
conduct distinction is well established, and courts steadfastly have refused to
break it down. 146 For that reason challenges to sodomy statutes have not relied
on the first amendment.
Like the freedom of speech and expression, the ninth amendment is avail-
able to challenge sodomy laws, but is seldom used. 147 The ninth amendment
reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people." 1 48 It serves as a
catch-all for those "essential rights" deeply rooted in society, but which have no
express support elsewhere in the Constitution. 149 Privacy is an example of such
a right.150 When the Supreme Court propounds a new right, however, it leaves
itself open to criticism that it is making, not interpreting, law. 151 For that rea-
son courts generally resist finding rights under the ninth amendment 152 and
have refused to extend to homosexuals the right to engage in sodomy on this
basis. 153
In addition to possible challenges under the ninth amendment, sodomy
laws may be attacked 154 under the eighth amendment proscription of cruel and
143. See Note, supra note 67, at 1293.
144. Matthew v. Marsh, No. 82-0216 (D. Me. Apr. 3, 1984), vacated, No. 84-1482 (1st Cir. Feb.
22, 1985), cited in Note, supra note 67, at 1295; see Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (naval petty officer discharged for homosexual activity); Rowland v. Mad River Local School
Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (high school guidance counselor terminated for homosexual
activity), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
145. The first argument is that criminalizing homosexual sodomy "chills" the freedom of expres-
sion. The second is that homosexual sodomy is itself a form of expression, like speech, that should
be protected by the first amendment. Note, supra note 67, at 1294-95. Neither argument has been
successful. See id.
146. See, eg., Matthew v. Marsh, No. 82-0216 (D. Me. Apr. 3, 1984), vacated, No. 84-1482 (1st
Cir. Feb. 22, 1985), cited in Note, supra note 67, at 1295. Commentators, however, continue to
criticize the distinction. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-7, at 599 (1978)
("The distinction between speech and conduct.., has no real content."); Kare, The Public/Private
Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1358, 1387 (1982) ("How can this distinction between
identity and conduct be tenable?"); Note, supra note 67, at 1295.
147. But see Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2849. Hardwick's "complaint expressly invoked the Ninth
Amendment." Id.
148. U.S. CONsT. amend. IX.
149. See United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 181 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951
(1980).
150. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486, 530.
151. Individual Justices have even admitted to making law. E.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,
221-22 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); Roe, 410 U.S. at 167-68 (Stewart, J., concurring).
152. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2845-46. For example, courts do not recognize an individual's
right to avoid a military draft, United States v. Zaugh, 445 F.2d 300 (9th Cir 1971), or parents'
absolute right to the custody of their children, In re Juvenile Appeal, 189 Conn. 276, 455 A.2d 1313
(1983).
153. See, eg., Doe, 403 F. Supp. 1199.
154. See, ag., Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368, cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1973).
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unusual punishment.15 5 The cruel and unusual punishment clause circum-
scribes the criminal process by (1) limiting the kinds of punishment that can be
imposed on criminals, (2) proscribing punishment grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the crime, and (3) imposing substantive limits on what activities
can be made criminal.1 56 The last two guidelines are particularly important in
challenging sodomy laws. The first argument is obvious: some states impose
punishment wholly out of line with the severity of the crime of sodomy.' 5 7 Even
if a court struck down a sodomy statute on this basis, however, the state legisla-
ture could enact a sodomy law that imposes a less severe penalty. 158 The second
argument is more subtle. A homosexual could assert that his or her homosexu-
ality is an immutable status and that acts of sodomy are manifestations of that
condition which should not be punished. 159 Although the Supreme Court has
held other conditions, like drug addiction, to be immune from criminal penal-
ties, 160 no court has offered such protection to homosexuals. 16
1
Finally, there is an argument that sodomy statutes violate the first amend-
ment prohibition of establishment of religion. 162 It is clear that sodomy statutes
have their origins in Judaeo-Christian doctrine.' 63 Several courts have even ap-
pealed to Biblical authority in upholding such laws. 164 Therefore, sodomy stat-
utes have no secular basis; instead they are an embodiment of Christian doctrine
that violates the establishment clause.165 The flaw in this argument, however, is
that although sodomy laws have historic religious roots, secular interests may
support them as well.' 66 One such interest might be in the preservation of socie-
tal morals apart from any religious bases.' 67 Another might be the prevention
of the spread of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Although
155. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
156. See Ingram v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
157. Comment, supra note 75, at 864 & n.353. Several statutes impose sentences of up to 20
years for a single act of sodomy. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 272, § 34 (West 1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1969).
158. Comment, supra note 75, at 865.
159. Comment, supra note 75, at 861-62.
160. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). But see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968)
(distinguishing status as alcoholic from act of public drunkenness).
161. See Comment, supra note 75, at 863-64. The problem here is like that confronted with the
first amendment freedom of speech. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text. Courts distin-
guish between the condition and the symptom, so that drug addiction is protected, but drug use is
not. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Simi-
larly, homosexuality could be protected while acts of sodomy would not. Comment, supra note 75,
at 863-64.
162. Richards, supra note 64, at 311-12; Comment, supra note 75, at 860. The first amendment
states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S. CoNsr.
amend. I.
163. Comment, supra note 75, at 860.
164. See, e.g., Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Condemnation of [sodomy]
is firmly rooted in Judaeo-Christian moral and ethical standards."); Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1202-03
(laws prohibiting sodomy "[have] ancestry going back to Judaic and Christian law").
165. Richards, supra note 64, at 312; Comment, supra note 75, at 860-61.
166. Richards, supra note 64, at 312; Comment, supra note 75, at 860-61; see, eg., Hatheway v.
Secretary of Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Carter v. State, 255
Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974); Stewart v. United States, 364
A.2d 1205 (D.C. 1976).
167. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (recognizing state's interest in
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these secular interests may merely mask underlying religious beliefs, a court
could rationalize the validity of sodomy laws on the basis of those interests. 168
In sum, sodomy statutes raise a variety of constitutional issues. In Bowers
the Supreme Court had a duty to examine each of those issues in the setting of
Michael Hardwick's action. The case was before the Court on defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. 169
Moreover,
[ilt is a well settled principle of law that "a complaint should not be
dismissed merely because a plaintiff's allegations do not support the
particular legal theory he advances, for the court is under a duty to
examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief
on any possible theory." 170
Even if Hardwick did not raise issues under the eight or ninth amendments or
the equal protection clause, the Court should not have dismissed his claim if any
of those issues could have entitled him to relief. The majority in Bowers simply
ignored these additional claims. 171 Because Bowers has important implications
for the right of privacy under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, it is neces-
sary to reexamine the Court's opinion on this claim as well as issues arising
preserving morals); Comment, supra note 75, at 860-61 ("Morality and religion are not
synonymous.").
168. There is one other, less important, potential constitutional challenge to sodomy statutes.
Because many state sodomy laws proscribe "crimes against nature," see, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
177 (1981), they may be open to a charge of unconstitutional vagueness. See generally Connally v.
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (A law is unconstitutionally vague if its language
"either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application .... ).
However, in Rose v. Locke the Supreme Court held that language like "crime against nature"
had a common law definition sufficient to withstand a vagueness inquiry. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S.
48, 49-53 (1975). Given Rose, a successful challenge to sodomy laws on vagueness grounds is un-
likely. Furthermore, even ifa law were struck down for vagueness, the state legislature could simply
rewrite it. In Bowers, moreover, the statute at issue is quite specific: "A person commits.., sodomy
when he performs... any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
169. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842-43; see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
170. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d
714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974)); accord Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("[A] complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."); Parr v. Great
Lakes Express Co., 484 F.2d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 1973) ("[A] complaint should not be dismissed
merely because its allegations do not support the legal theory on which the pleader intends to pro-
ceed."); Due v. Tallahassee Theaters, Inc., 333 F.2d 630, 631 (5th Cir. 1964) ("[llf the complaint
alleges facts which, under any theory of the law, would entitle the complainant to recover, the action
may not be dismissed for failure to state a claim."); United States v. Howell, 318 F.2d 162, 166 (9th
Cir. 1963) ("[A] motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action should not be granted unless
it appears certain that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could
proved in support of his claim."); 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 23, § 1357, at 601-02
("The complaint should not be dismissed merely because plaintiffs allegations do not support the
legal theory he intends to proceed on, since the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to
determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.").
171. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842-47. The Court simply noted that Hardwick did not pursue
claims under the ninth or eighth amendments or under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 2846 n.8. But see id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Brief for Respondent at
19-29, Bowers (No. 85-140) (implying an equal protection claim).
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under the eight and ninth amendments and the equal protection clause that the
Court declined to address.
The Bowers Court first discussed the right of privacy under the Griswold
line of cases.172 Speaking of these cases, the Court wrote:
[W]e think it evident that none of the rights announced in those cases
bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosex-
uals to engage in acts of sodomy .... No connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on
the other hand has been demonstrated .... 173
In contrast, Justice Blackmun found the majority's search for a connection be-
tween homosexual sodomy and the institutions of marriage, family, and procrea-
tion to be a "superficial" analysis.174 Justice Blackmun, along with
commentators and other courts, believes the Court should have looked at the
essence of these institutions to find a common ground on which to develop a
simple and workable doctrine of privacy. 175 Commentators have proposed vari-
ous formulations for such a doctrine. One judge has written: "I view [Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Roe] as standing for the principle that every individual has a
right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into one's decisions on
private matters of intimate concern." 176 In the context of sodomy laws, another
court has written: "'If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free of unwarranted government intrusion
into matters fundamentally affecting a person' as the decision to engage in pri-
vate sexual conduct with another consenting adult." 177 These commentators,
looking for the essence of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe, have found the individ-
ual's rights to be paramount. Marriage is fundamental because it is a way of life
for individuals, not because it is an entity unto itself bonded for the social good;
procreation is protected because parenthood changes a person's life forever, not
because it has some religious or cultural significance; the family is fundamental
because of its meaning for the individual, not because a nuclear family is proper
for our society.178 In short, "the concept of privacy embodies the 'moral fact
that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole.' "179
Instead of a simple, workable doctrine, however, the Bowers Court leaves a
right of privacy defined case by case in a piecemeal fashion. The majority delim-
172. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843-44.
173. Id. at 2844.
174. Id. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
175. Id.; see, ag., Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3338 (1986); Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1203-04 (Merhige, J., dissent-
ing); Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 637 (1980); Note, The Armed
Services Continued Degradation and Expulsion of Their Homosexual Members: Dronenburg v. Zech,
54 U. CIN. L. REv. 1055, 1056-57 (1986).
176. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
177. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1140 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972)), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3338 (1986).
178. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2187
n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288, 288-
89 (1977)).
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its the privacy doctrine to interests only within traditional frameworks of mar-
riage, procreation, and family. 180 Moreover, the Court gives no guidelines for
what exactly is covered by a privacy interest in family, marriage, or procreation.
For example, although unmarried couples, like married couples, have a right to
contraceptives, 181 it is unclear whether they have a right to engage in sodomy as
do married persons. Without proper guidelines, the doctrine is conclusory, and
because it is conclusory, lower courts will hesitate to break new ground with the
privacy doctrine. In this way, the Supreme Court has reserved to itself utter
dominance of the right of privacy; its application will be limited to the narrow
circumstances of the cases the Court considers.
In addition to the privacy doctrine, the Bowers majority examined Hard-
wick's fourth amendment claim. Hardwick argued that because the homosexual
act occurred in his bedroom, it should be protected by the sanctity of the
home. 1 82 Hardwick based this argument on Stanley. In Stanley the Supreme
Court held that although a state may punish the public distribution of obscene
material, it cannot punish the private possession of such material. 183 The Bow-
ers majority distinguished Stanley by contending that the Stanley Court had re-
lied entirely on the first amendment freedom of speech, not the fourth
amendment protection of the home.1 8 4
The Court, however, erred in this distinction. First, the Stanley opinion
stated:
[I]n the context of this case-a prosecution for mere possession of
printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a person's own home-that
[first amendment] right takes on an added dimension. For also funda-
mental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy.1 85
Later in the opinion, the Stanley Court wrote, "Whatever may be the justifica-
tions for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the
privacy of one's own home." 186 Second, the Stanley opinion quoted extensively
from Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead. Justice Brandeis wrote that the
framers of the Constitution "conferred, as against the Government, the right to
be let alone." 187 What is more significant about the Stanley Court's reliance on
Olmstead is that Olmstead involved no first amendment issue.1 88 Third, the
Stanley Court distinguished Roth v. United States,189 the leading obscenity case,
180. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843-44.
181. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
182. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
183. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564-65. Police found pornographic films in defendant's home while
searching under a warrant for evidence of bookmaking activities. Stanley was charged with posses-
sion of obscene material in violation of Georgia law. Id.
184. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
185. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
186. Id. at 565.
187. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In Olmstead the Court held that evi-
dence of an incriminating telephone conversation wire-tapped by the government and used in a
criminal trial did not violate the fifth amendment.
188. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
189. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In Roth defendant was charged with using the mails in violation of
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on the ground that the defendant privately possessed obscene material, whereas
Roth proscribed only public distribution of such material. 190 The Stanley Court
must have relied in part on the fourth amendment or the Court could not have
cited Olmstead or distinguished Roth. Fourth, other courts, 191 and even the
Supreme Court itself,192 have interpreted Stanley to involve fourth amendment
protections.
Furthermore, the Bowers Court's interpretation of Stanley sets up a conflict
with its earlier decisions that cannot be reconciled. Five years after Stanley the
Supreme Court decided Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton.193 In Paris the Court
relied on Roth in holding that there is no fourth amendment right of privacy "to
watch obscene movies in places of public accommodation."' 194 There was a po-
tential conflict between Paris and Stanley in that Paris involved the same con-
duct as in Stanley-watching obscene movies-but the conduct in Paris was not
protected, whereas it was in Stanley. The Paris Court reconciled this conflict on
the basis that Stanley watched obscene films in the privacy of his home, while
the Paris Theater exhibited them in public. 195 The Bowers Court, by stating that
Stanley did not involve the fourth amendment, removes this critical public/pri-
vate distinction and throws Stanley back into direct conflict with Paris.196
Finally, assuming that Stanley still has some meaning and that individuals
may still possess pornographic material in private, the Bowers decision is irra-
tional. 197 Under Stanley Michael Hardwick can enjoy movies, magazines, and
video tapes that graphically depict sexual activity by homosexuals. Yet, under
Bowers, Hardwick cannot perform the activities that he can watch. It is derisive
and irrational for the Court to attempt to draw a constitutional distinction be-
tween Hardwick seeking sexual gratification by viewing obscene material and
seeking gratification with a consenting adult partner in private.' 98 Given this
irrationality, the conflict between Stanley and Pars, and the earlier interpreta-
tions of Stanley, the Bowers Court was wrong to hold that the fourth amendment
was not at issue in Stanley.19 9
Apart from the discussion of Hardwick's privacy claims, the Bowers opin-
ion reads as though the Court consciously attempted to avoid the other constitu-
federal obscenity statutes. The Supreme Court reasoned that because of a strong state interest in
proscribing obscenity, obscene material is not protected by the constitutional freedoms of speech or
press. Id.
190. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 560-64.
191. See, eg., Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 351 n.3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977
(1976); Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1205 (Merhige, J., dissenting); Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 487, 415 N.E.2d at
939, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
192. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973).
193. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
194. Id. at 66.
195. Id. at 66-68.
196. Moreover, without the public/private distinction, Stanley conflicts with the earlier Roth
decision as well. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
197. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1141 (N.D. Tex 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986).
198. See id.
199. In the alternative, the Bowers Court could have intended to overrule Stanley entirely. That
would certainly remove any conflicts, but there is no suggestion to that effect in the Bowers opinion.
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tional issues rather than address them head-on. In particular, the way the
Supreme Court defined the issue before it seemed designed to skirt potential
claims under the ninth amendment, the privacy doctrine, and the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, the Court stated: "The issue
presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many
States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long
time.' '200 Thus the Court focused narrowly on homosexual sodomy and tradi-
tion. In contrast, Hardwick's brief stated: "At issue in this case is whether the
State of Georgia may send its police into private bedrooms to arrest adults for
engaging in consensual, noncommercial sexual acts, with no justification beyond
the assertion that those acts are immoral. '20 1 There is no mention of homosexu-
ality; instead Hardwick stressed the broader privacy issue. Like Hardwick, Jus-
tice Blackmun stated the issue as whether individuals have "the right to decide
for themselves whether to engage in particular forms of private, consensual sex-
ual activity," again addressing a broad right of privacy. 20 2
In connection with the ninth amendment claim, the Court's narrow focus
on homosexual sodomy is a classic example of deciding an issue in the way it is
defined. By concentrating on homosexual sodomy, the Supreme Court could
look at the broad language of the Constitution and truthfully state that Hard-
wick's claim had no express support there.20 3 At that point the Court could
have found a constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy only by
extending the protection of the ninth amendment. Feigning a resistance to pro-
claiming judge-made law and a need to protect the Court's legitimacy,2 ° 4 the
Court raised two alternative straw tests that Hardwick's claimed right had to
pass to receive constitutional recognition. To gain protection the right to engage
in homosexual sodomy would have to be " 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacri-
ficed,' "205 or be "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' -206
Given the majority's focus on homosexuality and the tests' reliance on history
and tradition, Hardwick's claim was destined to fail.
In short, the Court was saying that because homosexuality has been con-
demned for centuries, states may continue to criminalize it today.20 7 Both Jus-
tice Stevens and Justice Blackmun, in separate opinions, argued that neither the
length of time a belief has been in force nor the fact a majority of society holds
200. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
201. Brief for Respondent at 1, Bowers (No. 85-140).
202. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
203. See id. at 2844-46.
204. Id. at 2846.
205. Id. at 2844 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
206. Id. (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)). Com-
menting on these tests, the court in Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984), remarked
that they are less of a guide for lower courts to follow than conclusions about the specific rights in
question. The Supreme Court will label a claimed right "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty," then state it is protected. See id. at 1396.
207. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2854 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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such a belief should save it from the Court's closest scrutiny.208 Justice Black-
mun quoted Justice Holmes for support:
"It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past. '20 9
Had the majority considered the issue as defined by Hardwick or Justice Black-
mun and examined it more fully under the Constitution, instead of blind tradi-
tion, the Court would have had a more difficult time refusing ninth amendment
protection.
As it did with the ninth amendment, the majority defined the issue in a
manner obscuring the right of privacy and equal protection claims. Although
Hardwick challenged the constitutionality of Georgia's sodomy statute, which
on its face prohibits all acts of sodomy including those between married
couples, 210 the Court relegated the statute to a footnote and spent none of the
opinion analyzing it.2 11 In doing so, however, the Court did not dispose of the
claim; rather, it compounded the issue. First, because the statute's language is
broad enough to include married couples within its proscription of sodomy, it is
likely to be void on its face for infringing on married couples' right of privacy
under Griswold. Second, that the statute is enforced only against homosexuals
does not cure the privacy violation; instead, it raises a question of discriminatory
enforcement. If the Georgia legislature did not see fit to limit the statute's appli-
cation to homosexuals, how can the State justify such discrimination?2 12 Last,
there is an equal protection issue, distinct from the sodomy statute, in that
homosexuals as a class may require judicial protection.
To begin with, Justice Stevens analyzed the Georgia sodomy law in light of
the right of privacy. 21 3 Section 16-6-2(a) of the Georgia code reads: "A person
commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act
involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. '214
On its face the statute applies to all persons, married or single, heterosexual or
homosexual. "[I]ndividual decisions by married persons," however, "concern-
208. Id. at 2854 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L.
REV. 457, 469 (1897)).
210. For the text of the Georgia sodomy law, see supra note 14.
211. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842 n.l.
212. See id. at 2850 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In fact, the legislative intent behind Geor-
gia's latest sodomy law may have been to expand its reach to heterosexual activities. Under the
earlier statute, sodomy was "the carnal knowledge and connection against the order of nature, by
man with man, or in the same unnatural manner with woman." GA. CODE ANN. § 26-5901 (1933).
Two Georgia Supreme Court cases limited that law's applicability. In Thompson v. Aldredge, 187
Ga. 467, 200 S.E. 799 (1939), the Georgia Supreme Court held that § 26-5901 did not prohibit
lesbian activity. Id. at 467, 200 S.E. at 800. In a later case, the same court held that the statute did
not prohibit heterosexual cunnilingus. Riley v. Garrett, 219 Ga. 345, 346-47, 133 S.E.2d 367, 369-70
(1963). The Georgia legislature may have enacted the current, broader statute in response to these
restrictive cases. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2849 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Note, The
Crimes Against Nature, 16 J. PuB. L. 159, 167 n.47 (1967)).
213. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2856-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
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ing the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to pro-
duce offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. ' 215 Furthermore, this same protection extends to inti-
mate decisions made by unmarried persons.2 16 States "may not prohibit sod-
omy within 'the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms'" or between unmarried,
consenting, heterosexual adults.2 17 Georgia's Attorney General even admitted
that section 16-6-2 would be -unconstitutional if applied to married couples.2
Justice Stevens concluded that Georgia's sodomy statute is invalid because it
attempts to criminalize activity that is constitutionally protected.219 The Bowers
majority, however, ignored this issue completely.
Second, because Georgia's sodomy law may not be enforced as written, the
State's selective application to homosexuals necessarily discriminates against
them and raises an issue of equal protection.220 Several courts have held that
such discrimination violates the equal protection clause.22 1 Once discrimination
is established, the state must prove that it results from a "neutral and legitimate
interest. '222 Speaking of such an interest, Chief Justice Weintraub of the New
Jersey Supreme Court has stated: "I doubt the existence of a public interest
sufficient to justify an edict that the homosexual shall behave as a heterosexual
or not at all."' 223 In Baker v. Wade224 the District Attorney of Dallas County,
Henry Wade, testified that "he knew of no rational basis" for discriminating
between homosexuals and heterosexuals in applying sodomy statutes.225
Responding to Hardwick's argument that the Georgia sodomy law needs
support from a legitimate interest, the Bowers Court merely stated that "[t]he
law.., is constantly based on notions of morality, ' 226 implying that the sodomy
215. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965)); see supra notes 67-73, 172-81 and accompanying text.
216. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) ("[]he State could not, consist-
ently with the Equal Protection Clause, outlaw distribution [of contraceptives] to unmarried but not
to married persons.")).
217. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 and
citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453).
218. Id. at 2858 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D.
Tex. 1970), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971); Onofre, 51
N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947.
220. Georgia stated or implied in its brief that it sought to enforce § 16-6-2 only against homo-
sexuals. Brief for Petitioner at 20 passim, Bowers (No. 85-140).
221. E.g., Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971); Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599
P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979); Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947; see
Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1143 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986); Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1204 (Merhige, J., dissenting); Comment, supra
note 75, at 851.
222. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2859 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 398, 301 A.2d 748, 754 (1973) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring).
224. 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 3338 (1986).
225. Id. at 1145.
226. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846. The Court, however, cited no authority in support of its
conclusion.
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law needs nothing more. Yet it is not even clear that the law has firm moral
support. In Commonwealth v. Bonadio227 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
wrote: "[T]o suggest that deviate acts are heinous if performed by unmarried
persons but acceptable when done by married persons lacks even a rational ba-
sis, for requiring less moral behavior of married persons than is expected of un-
married persons is without basis in logic." '228 The Bonadio rationale applies to
Bowers by analogy. How can the Court suggest a sodomy law is justified on
moral grounds when the Court applies two moral standards: a lax one for mar-
ried couples and a strict one for homosexuals? Because Georgia's sodomy stat-
ute is applied only to homosexuals, Bowers clearly involved an equal protection
issue. The majority's opinion, however, did not address equal protection.
Last, distinct from the statutory application problem, Hardwick's case
raises an equal protection issue under the rubric of suspect classes. 229 Suspect
classification has four criteria: the group must suffer stigmatism, receive une-
qual treatment, be a discrete and insular minority, and possess an immutable
distinguishing characteristic. 230 Many commentators believe that there is a
strong case for making homosexuals a suspect class. 231 As already noted, sod-
omy laws reflect religious doctrine and historic prejudice; homosexuals have
long been the object of disgust and hate by much of society. Few would argue
that there is no stigma attached to being homosexual. 232 Likewise, homosexuals
suffer unequal treatment in areas such as housing, jobs, and child custody.233
As a group homosexuals are a discrete and insular minority: homosexual bars,
newspapers, lobbyists, and neighborhoods show a sense of community; personal
accounts in homosexual literature demonstrate that sexuality is fundamental to
an individual's identity.234 Although authorities are not in complete agreement,
most believe homosexuality is determined at an early age, perhaps before birth,
and is beyond the control of the individual. 235 Based on the Supreme Court's
own criteria, little distinguishes homosexuality from protected classes like race.
But the Court has never spoken on this issue, and it remained silent in Bowers.
The Bowers Court, moreover, was silent on other constitutional challenges
to Georgia's sodomy law, even when the Court's discussion implied them. The
majority's reliance on religious dogma, for example, suggests a question of the
227. 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
228. Id. at 99, 415 A.2d at 51.
229. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2850 n.2; supra notes 123-36 and accompanying text.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 130-35.
231. E.g., Comment, supra note 75, at 849; Note, supra note 67, at 1302.
232. See HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOMOSEXUALITY (S. Licata & R. Peterson ed. 1981);
J. KATz, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY (1976); Note, supra note 67, at 1302. Even judges have deni-
grated homosexuals. E.g., Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1039 (1970). Commenting on homosexual sodomy, Judge Skelton stated: "Any schoolboy
knows that a homosexual act is immoral, indecent, lewd, and obscene. Adult persons are even more
conscious that this is true." Id. at 1378.
233. Note, supra note 67, at 1285-86.
234. Note, supra note 67, at 1304. For examples of homosexual literature, see A. BANNON, I AM
A WOMAN (1959); R. BROWN, THE RUBYFRUIT JUNGLE (1973).
235. W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 151-60 (1973); Comment,
supra note 75, at 849 (citing Bancroft, Homosexuality in the Male, CONTEMP. PSYCHIATRY 173, 178-
79 (T. Silverstone & B. Barraclough ed. 1975)); Note, supra note 67, at 1302.
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establishment clause.236 Chief Justice Burger wrote "separately to underscore
[his] view" that "[c]ondemnation of [homosexual sodomy] is firmly rooted in
Judaeo-Christian moral and ethical standards. ' 237 The Chief Justice apparently
believed he was bolstering the majority's opinion when in fact he put the estab-
lishment clause in issue, then said no more about it.
Likewise, Justice Powell noted that Bowers involved an eighth amendment
issue of cruel and unusual punishment. He wrote: "The Georgia statute...
authorizes a court to imprison a person for up to 20 years for a single private,
consensual act of sodomy. In my view, a prison sentence for such conduct-
certainly a sentence of long duration-would create a serious Eighth Amend-
ment issue."' 238 Justice Powell went on to note that in Georgia an act of sodomy
is a felony comparable to aggravated battery and robbery.2 39 But Justice Powell
summarily ended his analysis at that point. He stated that because Hardwick
had not yet been tried, the eighth amendment issue was not before the Court. 24 °
It is true that Hardwick had not been tried at the time Bowers was decided; the
district attorney decided not to prosecute Hardwick "unless further evidence
developed." 24 1 The Georgia sodomy law, however, has a four year statute of
limitations. Because Hardwick still may be tried for sodomy, the eighth amend-
ment was properly before the Court. The majority, however, did not even com-
pare Georgia's sodomy law with statutes in other states. Had it done so, the
Court would have found that a majority of states no longer criminalize consen-
sual sodomy.242 Moreover, of all the major nations in North America and Eu-
rope, only the United States and the Soviet Union still punish such conduct. 24 3
To avoid repetitious litigation, judicial economy suggests that the Court should
have analyzed this issue to a conclusion.
Although Justice Powell touched on the obvious eighth amendment claim,
both he and the rest of the majority missed the more subtle argument. In addi-
tion to proscribing punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime, the eight amendment imposes a substantive limit on what activities can be
made criminal in the first place.244 One such limit is that the state cannot pun-
236. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2855 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra notes 162-68 and accompa-
nying text.
237. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
238. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 2848 (Powell, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 2842. Perhaps the state's attorney was waiting for evidence of a favorable decision in
Bowers.
242. Survey, supra note 13, at 524 n.9 (cited in Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2845-46). The Court stated
that because 24 states and the District of Columbia still criminalize sodomy, such statutes have
broad public approval. What the Supreme Court failed to recognize is that 24 is less than half the
states. In fact, "[tihe vast majority of the American population lives in reformed jurisdictions where
consensual sodomy is not criminalized." Brief of Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 12 n.6, Bowers (No. 85-140).
243. W. BARNETr, supra note 235, at 293. Countries in which consensual sodomy is legal in-
clude Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Poland, Iceland, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Den-
mark, Switzerland, Sweden, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, England and Wales, East and West
Germany, Canada, Finland, Austria, and Norway. Id.
244. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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ish a person for a condition over which he or she has no control, such as drug
addiction or alcoholism. 245 If homosexuality is immutable, then punishing sod-
omy effectively punishes homosexuals for urges beyond their control. In Powell
v. Texas,246 however, the Court held that although alcoholism cannot be made
criminal because it is an involuntary condition, public drunkenness can be made
criminal because it is voluntary conduct. Based on the condition/conduct dis-
tinction, the Bowers Court could have defeated this argument: homosexuality
would not be a crime, but sodomy would.2 47 But through oversight or delibera-
tion, the Court never addressed the argument.
The eighth amendment argument, however, is not all the Court missed.
The majority failed entirely to consider Hardwick's first amendment claim of
freedom of association. 24 8 Just two years prior to Bowers, the Supreme Court
wrote:
[C]hoices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relation-
ships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of
the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom
that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of
association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal
liberty. 249
The Court went on to state that the Constitution protects such relationships
because "individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties
with others."' 250 Are homosexuals so different from heterosexuals that they do
not need such "emotional enrichment?" Here again the Bowers Court was
taciturn.
In sum, all of these constitutional issues-the first amendment's establish-
ment clause and freedom of association, the eighth amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment, the ninth amendment's recognition of rights not
explicit in the Constitution, and the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause-were raised either by Michael Hardwick, commentators, or the Bowers
Court itself. At best, however, the majority summarily dismissed such claims,
like the eighth and ninth amendment challenges. The Court completely ignored
other issues such as the freedom of association, establishment, and equal protec-
tion clauses. Because Hardwick's case was before the Court on a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, the majority had a duty to analyze these
issues. Instead the opinion reads as if the majority made up its mind to deny
homosexuals constitutional protection, then applied whatever law and tradition
supported its position and ignored all authority and arguments to the contrary.
245. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2850 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); supra notes 159-61 and ac-
companying text.
246. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
247. It seems odd to tell someone that he or she may be homosexual but that he or she cannot
engage in sodomy. With such a dichotomy homosexuals have "no real choice but a life without any
physical intimacy." Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2850 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
248. Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1208 n.6; Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 9-10, Bowers (No. 85-140); see supra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
249. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984); see supra note 137.
250. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
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Had the Court analyzed the contrary authority properly, it would not have been
so quick to dismiss Hardwick's claim. As Justice Stevens noted, "[alt the very
least, ... it [was] clear at [that] early stage of the litigation that [Hardwick] ...
alleged a constitutional claim sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss."12
5 1
Of the claims the Bowers Court examined-the right of privacy under both
the fourth amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment-the majority created more issues than it resolved. The Court took the
right of privacy established by the Griswold line of cases and limited it to those
situations involving the family, procreation, and marriage. The Court, more-
over, set up no guidelines by which to apply the privacy doctrine even within
this narrow traditional framework. Without guidance lower courts will resist
extending the doctrine to new situations; in effect, the Supreme Court has as-
sured itself that privacy will remain limited unless and until the Court expressly
rules otherwise. To confuse the privacy doctrine further, the majority took the
leading fourth amendment case, Stanley, and read the concept of sanctity of the
home out of it. In doing so, the Bowers Court put Stanley in direct conflict with
other decisions such as Paris and Roth. The majority leaves this conflict un-
resolved. To paraphrase Justice Blackmun, "the Court's cramped reading of
[the privacy issues] before it makes for a short opinion, but it does little to make
for a persuasive one." 2
52
The Court's treatment of the right of privacy and its nontreatment of Hard-
wick's other constitutional claims are the great failings of this opinion. Granted,
questions of equal protection and freedom of association are difficult to resolve,
but is that sufficient justification for the Court to shirk its duty to analyze them
to conclusion? Or is it simply that such an analysis leads to a result inconsistent
with the way the majority felt Bowers should turn out? And is there any reason
for the Supreme Court to have left the privacy doctrine in such a confused and
crippled state? This Note concludes with these questions unanswered, like so
many of the issues in Bowers, and with the hope that the Court will find the
opportunity to resolve them.
JOSEPH ROBERT THORNTON
251. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2859 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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